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  The world has long known that advances in knowledge are crucial to economic growth, 
that broad mass education advances knowledge, and that the United States has had one of the 
world’s highest per-capita income levels since the nineteenth century.  We have also believed 
that these familiar facts are linked.  Ever since the British and others were struck by American 
technology exhibits at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851, it has been natural to give 
American education much of the credit for this country’s advances in knowledge and its 
prosperity.   
  Scholars have shown that by 1850 the Americans had roughly caught up with Prussia, the 
earlier leader, in the share of GDP devoted to education and also in enrollments.
1   The 
enrollment leadership relative to other countries came much earlier in mass primary education 
than in higher education.  The Americans were also leaders in raising public tax money to 
supplement the traditional reliance on private tuition. 
  American leadership in public mass schooling may seem puzzling to many non-
specialists. Given the usual narrative flow, one would expect that the Founding Fathers wisely 
encouraged universal primary schooling from the very start.  Yet their Constitution said 
essentially nothing on the subject, and most of them were not enthusiastic about involving the 
federal government in education.  Jefferson’s attempts to raise tax money for schooling all 
whites bore no direct fruit, either in his native Virginia or in the nation as a whole.  True, the 
federal government helped fund education with earmarked land grants to the states.  Yet the land 
grants were not heavily used for schools in the early decades, especially in the new South.
2  As 
Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz have emphasized, the movement was largely decentralized and 
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spontaneous.
3  Americans at the grass-roots level often developed their primary schools some 
decades before help arrived from above, and they did it largely by voting to tax themselves.  
How did education arise so soon and so spontaneously in a country that resembled Russia in its 
rich opportunities in agriculture, forestry, and mining?  Those non-specialists who think of 
America’s birth as anti-government and anti-tax may also be puzzled by the willingness of early 
Americans to lead the world in shifting from private tuition toward taxes for primary schools.  
  America’s peculiarly high fertility makes the pattern even more puzzling.  At the start of 
the nineteenth century, the United States had more children per adult than did Western Europe.
4  
Common sense suggests that the relative abundance of children would have burdened any system 
attempting to educate them.  Twentieth-century experience agrees, and our own analysis will 
find the expected negative effect of extra children on the schooling of the average child.  How 
did the Americans manage to pay for so much schooling per child when families were so large?   
  Fortunately, specialists in the history of American education have advanced our 
understanding of these developments and the likely forces behind them.  We know that the rise 
of primary schooling antedated the campaigns for state school systems led by Horace Mann, 
Henry Barnard, and Calvin Wiley.
5  Scholars have found both private and social motivations 
behind the early start.  American households’ demand for educating their own children are 
thought to have been reinforced by Protestant emphasis on the written Word, as well as by the 
desire to prepare their children for the commercial and professional opportunities of a fast-
growing nation.  The literature has given at least as much emphasis to social motivations to pay 
for the schooling of other people’s children.  There was widespread insistence that a literate and 
numerate made better citizens and neighbors, thereby strengthening the new Republic. 
Northeastern industrial areas worried greatly about the effects of immigration and the rise of 
manufacturing on the social fabric.  Some of these forces have looked stronger than others, 
according to the careful analysis of Massachusetts experience by Carl Kaestle and Maris 
Vinovskis.
6 One other strand of scholarship has suggested for at least a century that something 
about American democracy and political voice favored education at public expense.
7   
  This paper offers new evidence on how, where, and why mass education spread so much 
sooner in some parts of North America than elsewhere, and tests competing ideas about 
underlying causes.  Our contrast between regions stresses the roles of three forces, one 
unfamiliar to the past literature and two familiar.  The rural North led the world in the building of    Page  3 
schools, the hiring of teachers, and overall enrollments because (a) basic education was supplied 
more affordably there, (b) decentralized local governments had more autonomy there, and (c) 
political voice was spread more broadly within its communities.  
  The next section sets up the broad geographic contrasts in enrollment rates and in support 
per student, starting at the better-lit map of U.S. education in 1850.  We summarize what is 
known about the earlier progress toward this 1850 pattern of education, describing the mixed 
private-public interplay of school finance in the era of “rate bills.”  Section II offers evidence on 
three likely sources of the contrasts in enrollment and expenditure rates between regions and 
nations.  Section III presents a straightforward theory about how the political voice mechanism 
interacts with parents’ private demand for schooling, to produce different degrees of public 
commitment in different settings.  Section IV analyzes why counties’ public commitments to 
schools differed within the North and within the South as of 1840 and 1850.  This analysis 
assumes that voting rights and voter participation are the same thing, and that their effect on 
education is exogenous.  Doubts naturally arise about such assumptions, and Section V looks 
more deeply inside the votes-and-schools nexus, performing different kinds of experiments 
where the data permit.  It will turn out that there is strong prima facie evidence for shifting the 
historiography of early American education into a deeper exploration of how political voice was 
distributed at the local level.  
 
 
I. THE PATTERNS TO BE EXPLAINED 
 
  To summarize how the timing of the rise of primary schooling differed between 
communities, let us begin with a broad international geography and with the relatively abundant 
information for the mid-nineteenth century.  From this initial vantage point we then disaggregate 
among regions, and sketch how the geography and the style of American primary education 
seems to have evolved in the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth.   
  Among nations in the mid-nineteenth century, the United States was already becoming a 
leader in several respects.  The contrast best known to observers at the time showed up in 
enrollment rates like those that Table 1 displays for 1830-1850. By mid-century white children in 
the United States were already enrolled for as much primary schooling as children in any country    Page  4 
other than Prussia, and most of that instruction was delivered in what were called public or 
common schools.  The extra enrollment did not mean crowded classrooms: The United States 
may have stood out even more in its supply of teachers than in the more publicized enrollment 
rates, as best we can judge from incomplete and not always comparable measures.  As of 1850 
this country’s elementary and secondary schools had 2.7 teachers per hundred students in public 
schools and 2.9 per hundred in all schools.  No other country except perhaps France seems to 
have matched this rate.
8 The striking supply of American teachers may have partly reflected two 
features to be discussed shortly: the use of part-time seasonal teachers, and the greater 
feminization of American teaching.   
  Antebellum America’s distinction in the numbers of pupils and teachers was attained 
with a less outstanding level of expenditure on the part of its parents and taxpayers.  Whether or 
not the United States was a leader at mid-century depends on the measure and concept one 
prefers.  If one measures tax and tuition effort by the share of income spent on primary 
education, this country would again appear to have shared the lead with Prussia, both in public 
and in private expenditures.  Yet it did not stand out in the generosity of public primary-school 
support per child as a percentage of the average income per adult.  True, the United States was 
well ahead of Britain, when one measures a support ratio equal to (public primary-school 
expenditures per child of school age) divided by (GDP per adult).  Yet it was not ahead of 
France, Belgium, or Germany in this support ratio, for two reasons.  First, the United States had 
more children per adult than those European countries, especially France, so that our 
expenditures were not outstandingly generous per child.
9  Second, as we will note below, the 
same education services seem to have been cheaper in America.   
  Within the United States, states and regions differed greatly in their commitment to 
schooling. Tables 2 and 3 identify some of the striking spatial patterns revealed by the census 
snapshot of 1850.  What emerges, and demands explanation, is a distinctive style of the rural 
North, which accounted for most of this nation’s high rates of schooling. Specifically, the rural 
North had over 70 percent of the nation’s students and over 70 percent of its teachers, both 
among public schools and among all schools combined -- even though the relative expenditures 
on schools were not so concentrated there.
10   
 
[Tables 2 and 3 about here, on facing pages.]    Page  5 
 
  To spot these patterns within Tables 2 and 3, let us start with the expenditures supplied 
and then proceeding to the teachers hired and the enrollment response.  At the top of each table, 
studying the total revenues per enrolled pupil yields clear contrasts.  The South spent more than 
the North per pupil, and the cities spent more than the rural areas per pupil, partly because the 
South and the cities supplied a higher quality education through academies and colleges.  The 
regional contrast was driven by private expenditures, with not much contrast in public 
expenditures per pupil.  Cities outspent the rural areas, per pupil, both in public money and in 
private money.  Clearly, rural Northern pupils attracted the fewest dollars.  So did rural Northern 
teachers.  
  Yet the mirror image is just as striking: It was the rural North that had the most students 
and the most teachers, per student or per child, of school age.  When we count people rather than 
dollars, the rural North stood out among regions in the same way that the United States stood out 
among countries.  The strongest contrast favoring the rural North is shown by the row reporting 
the number of teachers per 100 free children of primary-school age: The rural North had twice as 
many as any other area. Enrollments were highest in the northernmost tier.  Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont led in this respect, at least from the 1830s on.  From there the high 
enrollments seem to have spread west to Upper Canada and to Michigan.
11 
  To chart the emergence of different education systems among and within states requires a 
methodological shift away from reliance on legal histories, and toward more studies of how 
school finance and administration actually operated at the community level. For example, one 
should resist the temptation to cite the earliest colonial laws as a source of schooling progress.  
True, both Connecticut and the Massachusetts Bay Colony passed laws in the 1640s and 1650s 
mandating universal elementary schooling. Localities and parents were subject to various fines if 
they did not comply.  Yet progress was limited in the New England colonies, as in England itself, 
partly because only basic literacy and religion were mandated and partly because so little funding 
was provided.
12 
  By studying the earliest history of school laws in the independent United States, without 
hard numbers, one could also get the patterns wrong in two ways.  One mistake would be to date 
progress from the passage of states laws allowing their localities to levy taxes for local schools.  
That wave of laws lagged behind actual practice by years or decades, unlike the precocious    Page  6 
colonial cases just mentioned.  The only such state laws before 1820 were those of Connecticut 
in 1786, New Hampshire 1789, and South Carolina in 1811.
13  Despite this last early law, the 
whites of South Carolina remained among the least schooled in America for the next two 
centuries. A more common disconnect with the law was the fact that local fiscal initiative 
actually preceded the arrival of state laws enabling localities to levy taxes for schools, as James 
G. Carter noted as early as 1824.
14  The main exception was New York State, where the state 
government led others in encouraging and monitoring schools, even though they were still 
largely private, as Nancy Beadie has emphasized.
15   We suspect that the future quantitative 
history of this era will agree with Carl Kaestle’s summary of the state of schooling at the time of 
the Revolution: “Nowhere was schooling entirely tax supported or compulsory.... Even the oft-
cited Massachusetts school laws of the seventeenth century had insisted only that towns maintain 
schools, not that they had to be free.  No one had imagined anything as comprehensive as the 
plans of the Revolutionary generation.”
16 
  Another mistake would be to date the support of public schools from the establishment of 
a state permanent school fund. The most impressive case is the large fund set up by Connecticut 
in 1795, out of proceeds from selling off its Western Reserve lands in Ohio. Yet it has been 
argued that the fund got poor results, partly because it crowded out local funding.  More serious, 
most states receiving the “permanent school fund” money either sat on it for a couple of decades 
or, as in the case of Tennessee, siphoned the money away to non-education uses.
17  This is not to 
argue that the new state funds played no role in promoting schools, but merely that their timing is 
not a reliable guide to the advance of schooling.  
  The contours of early American schooling can be drawn only very roughly, because 
schooling was a fluid, diverse, and voluntary experience before the Civil War, in ways that 
complicate our measurements.  Students moved in and out of school on an irregular basis, 
blending work experience with further installments of school learning. They went to school more 
regularly in the winter and summer than in fall or spring, and responded to daily changes in work 
and weather.  Children might begin their studies at three or four, and might be resuming them 
past the age of twenty, after long absences.  Such student transience has probably inflated some 
of the enrollment and attendance rates of Tables 2 and 3, certainly for the United States and 
probably also for other countries before the late nineteenth century.  There was probably some    Page  7 
double counting of students who attended the separate summer and winter session, especially 
when they went to different schools.
18   
  Eclecticism also characterized the teaching and the financing of schools.  Teacher 
credentials and the curriculum were not at all standardized.  The primary and secondary levels 
were not sharply divided from each other, even in the more public common-school system, and 
unregulated academies and grammar schools played a major role.
19  The state and national data-
collectors coped with this diversity by grouping schools into two broad categories, the first being 
“public” or “common schools” and the second consisting of academies and “private and select 
schools.”  We shall follow the same rough but convenient distinction here. 
  The early rise of schooling and its sources of funds are clearer for New York than for 
other states, thanks to New York’s passing a bill in 1795 setting up a permanent school fund. 
Twenty years later the state fund had accumulated enough to begin spending, and we have the 
benefit of annual reports from the New York Superintendent of Common Schools starting as 
early as 1815. 
  Who paid for the schooling? The numbers for New York reveal the kind of private-public 
mix suggested by qualitative accounts for all Northern states.  Total demand for primary 
schooling advanced ahead of public supply, and venture schools and academies stepped in to fill 
the gap.
20  Figure 1 shows the breakdown of public school funding given by the official reports 
on New York’s common schools. Parents and other private sources paid more than half of the 
cost of their children’s schooling up to 1838-1840, when the common schools got a fresh 
infusion of public money.  Of the public funds, more than half came from local taxes until mid-
century.   
  Thus the early mix of funds was a half-empty and half-full glass, both for New York and 
for the nation.  One could reasonably emphasize the long persistence of private tuition.  On the 
other hand, there are two reasons for emphasizing the public half of the glass: The Northern 
states were ahead of Europe and the South in the reliance on public money and publicly run 
schools, and eventually every country that has developed universal primary schooling came to 
rely primarily on taxes.   
  
 
II. THREE SOURCES OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC SCHOOLING    Page  8 
 
  If the emergence of high Northern levels of primary schooling, relying largely on public 
support, should be dated somewhere in the early nineteenth century, we still need to know why 
the early Americans had so much demand for schooling, and why the political preference for 
making it public schooling?  Since the questions imply international comparisons, this section 
turns to broad evidence suggesting why the rural North America seemed to differ from Europe, 
from Northern cities, and from the South.  The next section will test the power of the same ideas 
to explain differences at the county level. 
  In the broad contrasts among nations and regions, three differences stand out. 
 
More Affordable Schooling 
 
  Common folk in the northern states had higher labor incomes than their counterparts in 
Western Europe and the American South, and probably also faced lower prices of schooling, 
thanks largely to a more abundant supply of female teachers.  We present some evidence first on 
the real income differences, and then on the price of schooling.   
  Since parents in richer areas usually have a higher total demand for schooling, the high 
enrollments would seem less puzzling if the colonial and newly independent Northerners had 
been as rich as the Western Europeans and white Southerners. That appears to have been the 
case, though showing it requires turning away from national income estimates toward real wage 
data. Using GDP per capita to measure relative prosperity has led to an unresolved debate over 
just when the United States overtook the United Kingdom.  Some argue for a catch-up by the 
1850s, while others argue that Britain led until the turn of the century.
21  The GDP issue is not 
easily resolved, given the severity of the index number problems with international comparisons 
of real incomes.   
  A clearer trans-Atlantic contrast in real incomes appears if we turn instead to a 
comparison of real wages for common occupational groups. Schooling has always been held 
back most severely for parents at lower income levels, who have less creditworthiness and less 
ability to invest in their children for a distant return.  Economists have consistently found that the 
social rate of return is higher for poorer countries than for rich, and higher for primary education 
than for tertiary (e.g. university) education.
22  Those in higher income ranks can afford to pay for    Page  9 
schooling out of pocket or by borrowing.  Their enrollment problem is not severe, even though 
their demand for school quality remains sensitive to their income levels.  The poor, by contrast, 
often lack the ability to purchase any schooling at all.  If poor white Americans were better off 
than the poor in other countries, they might have spontaneously demanded more education -- 
even if the nation as a whole had a lower real GDP per capita than Britain or the Netherlands.   
  What we are now learning about real wages around the world suggests that North 
American white workers in standard occupations could indeed buy more of the basics of life than 
workers anywhere else.
23  Figure 2 offers a simple first clue, by comparing the ability of three 
common kinds of workers to buy an eight-commodity bundle of consumer goods in 
Massachusetts versus England, the ostensible world leader in GDP per capita.  For each of the 
three occupational comparisons, workers in Massachusetts could buy more of that bundle than 
their counterparts in England. Carpenters in Massachusetts could buy more than English building 
craftsmen, and Massachusetts common laborers could buy more than English laborers, whether 
they worked in the building trades or in agriculture.  Nor is this contrast sensitive to the choice of 
weights in the eight-commodity bundle, since most of the commodities cost fewer days of labor 
each year in America than in Europe.  The Massachusetts workers probably could also pay less 
for housing, though they presumably paid more for cloth.  Workers who could afford more of 
most basic goods than workers anywhere else in the world would also have had a better chance 
to afford a few years of basic schooling for their children.  Similarly, as a hint about North-South 
differences, between 1800 and 1860 farm workers in Massachusetts enjoyed nearly twice the 
ability to buy food with their daily wage as did farmers in Western Virginia.
24  Our estimates 
may be sensitive to unknown mismatches between wholesale and retail prices, or between wage 
rates that don’t treat payments in kind (e.g. board and fuel) consistently.  Yet the estimated real-
wage advantages of Massachusetts over England or Western Virginia are great enough to 
withstand refinement of the measures.   
  Even if laborers in the northern United States could afford more basic consumer goods 
than their counterparts in England or the South, their demand for schooling might have been no 
greater if they had to pay more for schools and for teachers than elsewhere. Yet the few available 
clues suggest that schooling, like basic consumer goods, was actually cheaper for those better-off 
workers in the northern states.  So say the Anglo-American data contrasts in Table 4.
25  Contrasts 
in the costs of schooling are complicated, of course, by differences in school quality, length of    Page  10 
school year, and the generosity of public subsidy.  Nonetheless, schools seemed a bit cheaper in 
America than in England and Wales, both as a fee to be paid privately by parents and as a total 
annual cost per student.  Let us compare the costs of educating a child for 18 weeks in 1840s 
New York and 1830s Manchester.  The total private and public cost of that much primary 
schooling in New York in 1841-42 was only 0.39 weeks of common labor earnings, with the 
parents themselves paying less than half as much.  By contrast, 18 weeks of primary schooling 
cost 0.62 weeks of common labor earnings in Manchester 1834, and more than that later.  Table 
4 offers other contrasts for various types of schools.  In general, school was so much cheaper in 
New York than in England that we should doubt that the whole difference was explained by 
school quality. 
  How could schooling be cheaper in one country than in another, even when we are 
looking at the total costs shared by taxpayers, donors, and parents?  Since school costs are 
dominated by teacher pay, one immediately wonders whether teachers were paid less in America 
than in England, relative to the earnings of common laborers.  Panel B of Table 4 suggests an 
affirmative answer.  Here again, as with fees, the comparison is complicated by differences in 
product, in this case the type of teacher.  Still, it seems clear that on the average teachers were 
more affordable for common laborers and for parents of other occupations in New York than in 
England.   
  Teachers in the rural North might also have been cheaper than teachers in the South.  For 
example, around 1853 Northern rural female teachers accepted lower monthly wages from 
common schools than teachers in North Carolina.
26 If deeper studies agree with these early hints, 
then rural Northern teachers may have been more affordable in the sense that paying for a 
teacher’s services cost an ordinary Northern worker fewer days of his income than the cost faced 
by working families in England or the South.  
  One likely reason:  The Northern states seem to have been world leaders in the 
feminization of teaching, a fact that may have made teachers less scarce relative to common 
laborers and other mostly-male occupations.
27   Behind the leadership in supplying female 
teachers lay an early lead in female literacy as well.  We can now compare the signature literacy 
of brides (and bridegrooms) on both sides of the Atlantic from the seventeenth century on.   
Already by mid-eighteenth century the young women of the Northern colonies were more literate 
than the young women of England, Scotland, and continental Europe, the leading possible    Page  11 
competitors being women in Holland and Sweden.
28  Within the United States, females qualified 
to teach were more abundantly supplied in the lower-paying North, a fact reflected in the rise of 
Northern women as applicants for teaching jobs in North Carolina.
29  A renewed exploration of 
the international history of education supply is likely to feature Northern American women as 
world leaders in the supply of primary school teachers.   
 
Local Autonomy  
 
 
  By itself, greater affordability would only help to explain a higher private demand for 
education, and would not explain why taxes would be paid.  In early settings, levying new taxes 
for schools was even more difficult than today, since the demand was still just emerging and 
public supply could be blocked by those with property, especially by those who wanted labor to 
remain unskilled and abundant.  An institutional feature that made it easier to launch public 
education on a limited scale was decentralization in voting on school issues.  The more local the 
voting mechanisms, the greater the chance that an exceptionally high-demand local population 
could choose to tax itself, unblocked by opponents from other parts of the country.   
  Such decentralization of government was the second salient feature of the Northern 
states, relative both to Europe and to the South.  Even in the colonial era, British policy already 
tended to give towns more fiscal autonomy in the American colonies than in Britain.  The U.S. 
Constitution reinforced this local autonomy, by using federalism and other safeguards to impede 
the exercise of central government authority. On the schooling front, local autonomy was often 
extensive even where a centralized state board kept accounts on all school districts.  For New 
York State before 1850, we know that state law deferred to local autonomy in most decisions 
regarding funding.  Even those state laws that were passed were confined to providing only 
partial support and little regulation or finance at the district level, at least until 1850. 
  This decentralization meant that schools were both financed and controlled more locally 
in the Northern states than in either Europe or the American South.  The international contrast 
shows up in the revenue sources for schools in Europe and North America in the 1870s.  The 
United States and Canada (along with Italy and the Netherlands) stood out by having schools 
paid for by local governments, rather than privately or by higher levels of government.  England 
and Wales was the main bastion of reliance on private tuition.
30  The English and Welsh were    Page  12 
trapped into centralization by Parliamentary rulings that put insurmountable barriers in the way 
of localities wanting to tax themselves for schools.
31  Such barriers help to explain why England 
and Wales lagged in enrollments and school funding until a centralized fiscal solution was 
reached in 1891.   
  Decentralization also distinguished the North from the South.  Historians have identified 
two Southern institutional tendencies that stood in the way of local school development: 
centralization of power throughout the region, and elitism in the laws governing membership in 
Southern legislatures.  In both these institutional respects, the South resembled nineteenth-
century England.   
  Throughout the South, power was relatively centralized.  State legislatures dominated, 
and seem to have appointed judges and county officials and even governors more often than in 
the North.  County officials, in turn, retained power that might have devolved to townships.
32 
The effect was much the same as in the case of Parliament’s stifling local government taxes and 
services in nineteenth-century England: Localities had little freedom to raise their own taxes for 
schools or infrastructure within a larger polity that lacked their enthusiasm for such public goods.   
  The South also tended toward elitism in public office, though democracy was gaining 
over time and was stronger in the newer states.  The most elitist laws of political representation 
were those in five states: North Carolina, South Carolina, pre-1851 Maryland, pre-1835 Georgia, 
and pre-1845 Louisiana all had stiff property requirements for serving in the legislature.  Many 
Southern states also denied membership in the legislature to ministers, or bankers, or non-
Christians, or duelists, or U.S. government officials.  Virginia had its own gerrymandered system 
of representation, explicitly designed to deny voice to the yeoman western counties and favor the 
slaveholding east, with the result that state budgets were biased toward developing the eastern 
lowland counties.
33  The elitism has been aptly summarized by Ralph Wooster’s studies of 
legislators and county officials throughout the antebellum South. In nine states, a majority were 
also slaveholders. The chances of being a state legislator were far greater for planters, 
slaveholders, and realty owners than for others.  While Northern legislators were presumably 
also richer than the average citizen, Southern representation was impressively stacked toward 
groups that would have seen little direct benefit in paying taxes for schools.
34 An additional 
mechanism might have translated the Southern propertied elite’s aversion to taxes into lower 
votes for school funding.  When the ballot was not secret, as it was not in the United States    Page  13 
before around 1890, the local elite could also easily determine who its opponents were on 
political issues. While we lack smoking-gun evidence that wealthy slave-owners pressured other 
voters at election time, the open ballot did give them a chance to do so.
35 
  Local government autonomy may have expanded schooling more than it raised other 
kinds of government expenditure.  Economists have found that economies of scale in public 
goods are least evident in the case of basic education.
36  There is a lower minimum-cost point for 
spending on education than on, say, flood control or highways or national defense.  This could 
have bred schools that were local and tax-based and efficient in the township orientation of rural 
northern states.  Small towns might have achieved a moderately efficient scale with a single 
schoolhouse, using lower tuition to assure a minimum necessary attendance in a sparse 
countryside.  Correspondingly, there were fewer other projects for public spending that could 
have competed against schools in the small-town budget debates.  As we shall see, this 
conjecture draws support from the public school patterns across the counties of the United States. 
 
Voting and Voice 
 
  The third broad force that delivered more schooling in the American North than 
elsewhere was the breath of political voice.  The likelihood of voting for taxes to pay for 
schooling is generally higher, the greater the political voice heard from the lower income ranks.  
Here too, ordinary white Americans had an advantage over common men in the European 
countries they and their ancestors came from: They had more political voice relative to local 
elites, and increasingly so over the first half-century of independence. The United States led 
Britain, France, and the rest of Europe, just as Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff have 
found that North Americans had more voting rights than Latin Americans.
37 The earlier suffrage 
of middling American white citizens seems to have accelerated the rise of public primary 
schooling, through mechanisms we will model and test in the next two sections. 
  North and South differed in political voice, broadly defined, though this was not because 
of any great difference between the two regions in white men’s legal right to vote. On the 
contrary, the franchise rules were fairly similar between the two regions before the Civil War, 
once one sets aside the complete lack of political rights for slaves. Rather what limited the    Page  14 
political voice of ordinary white Southern men was the already-mentioned restrains on who 
could serve in the state legislature.   
  Within each region, there were very different patterns of the franchise among counties.  
Even after states had repealed their property requirements for suffrage, most of them retained 
residency and citizenship requirements.  These had very different effects in different counties.  
Where a large share of men was just recently arrived from outside the county and state, voting 
was more concentrated among those with the most potentially taxable property.  Thus even in 
mid-century counties differed in how far suffrage extended down the ranks, much as if the earlier 
property restrictions emphasized by England and Sokoloff were still in effect.  We argue that this 
should have mattered to schooling in theory, and that it did matter in practice.  We next present a 
theory featuring a link from political voice to public schools, and later find that the predicted 
political influences indeed played a role in the 1840s and 1850s.   
 
 
III. HOW VOICE COULD MATTER 
 
  Explaining the patterns in primary schooling means testing a model, one that 
simultaneously predicts how voting restrictions and other forces might have determined the 
levels of school attendance and of school financial support.  This section sketches the 
assumptions and predictions of a simple formal model presented more fully elsewhere.
38   
  The model must start from the schooling institutions of the rate-bill world before the 
1850s.  In this world, the local political process chose how many weeks of schooling to fund 
through local property taxes. Given that amount, parents would then decide whether to buy extra 
weeks’ worth of schooling by paying rate bills, or whether to buy schooling in private 
academies, where the share paid by taxes was lower and the quality of schooling generally 
higher.  
  Within this institutional context, we model two kinds of optimizing behavior at once. 
Each parental household makes private decisions about whether to enroll each child in school, 
and whether to pay rate bills to length the school year for their children. Their choices are shaped 
by their incomes, what the child could earn as a laborer instead of attending school, and the 
supply of tax-based schooling.      Page  15 
  That supply of taxed-based schooling in turn is driven by the optimizing behavior of a 
decisive voter.  Note that the decisive voter is not just a median individual from the whole 
population, but a power-weighted decisive voice among those who have any say in the local 
politics of school finance.  The more restrictive the access to voice, the higher the decisive voter 
in the economic ranks, and the more inclined he would be to feel the burden of a higher rate of 
property tax.  Given his position, he chooses a tax rate corresponding to a level of subsidized 
school quality.  Quality manifests itself as a share of the year that children spend in school, and 
an average class size.  
  The model predicts that extending the franchise to men lower down the wealth ranks will 
increase tax support for common schools. Against this, some key negative influences would be a 
larger share of school-age children in the population and a higher wage rate for child labor. The 
tastes of parents and of decisive local voters are also affected by religion, urbanization, and 
adults’ childhood experiences with schooling. 
 
 
IV. DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOLING AT MID-CENTURY 
 
  We can exploit the diversity of conditions in antebellum communities to test our view of 
what made the whole country different from Europe, and to test more general theories of 
educational progress.  Let us begin, however, with an explanation of why some popular ideas of 
the determinants of education cannot be tested in the laboratory of early America. 
  Three popular insights about education fail to explain the differences among American 
localities, even though they help to explain the overall demand for schools, and help to explain 
why North America was different.  First, economists will naturally think that the decision to 
raised taxes for a local school will be driven by the durable insight published by Charles Tiebout 
back in the 1950s: People can shop for the local government they want by migrating toward a 
town that has an efficient mix of taxes and public goods, such as schooling.  An equilibrium is 
eventually established in which some towns have residents who prefer their higher taxes and 
better schools, while other towns have residents that prefer their lower taxes and poorer 
schools.
39 But which places are which? To embody the idea in a statistical test that will separate    Page  16 
one American town from another, one must think of measurable proxies for residents’ tastes for 
schooling and for the efficiency of local government.  The Tiebout model adds nothing here.  
  A second insight, that schools build national values, was as popular with writers in the 
newly independent nation as it is with today’s historians of education.  Surely, they thought, a 
more literate and numerate citizenry would make this democratic republic more harmonious and 
self-correcting.  Today’s economists agree, calling this an external benefit of education.  Yet 
here again, as with the Tiebout model, there is no way to differentiate among American towns in 
the nineteenth century, since few towns opposed education in order to breed traitors.  The 
national values argument cannot explain why Washington County Maine spent four times as 
much per white child of school age as Washington County Georgia in 1850. 
  A third insight about the demand for education that fails to differentiate about American 
towns is the fact that the children of richer families demand more schooling.  It is true that at the 
level of the individual household, the children of richer parents attended school more faithfully 
and at higher expense.
40  Yet the same patterns fail to show so clearly at the county level in 1850, 
especially when we seek to explain public support and public school attendance rather than total 
attendance in all kinds of schools.  So we conclude from county-level regressions in which 
IPUMS data allowed us to explore the effects of the level and inequality of real estate ownership 
on school enrollments and school finance in 1850.  Even if a more positive wealth effect had 
shown up at the county level, it would have stirred up economists’ usual suspicions of 
simultaneity bias and reverse causation that have always complicated attempts to estimate the 
demand for education.  It is better to accept a reduced-form approach linking education to deeper 
causes that affect both income and education.  Our reduced-form strategy also sets aside the use 
of economic sectoral shares, such as shares of the local economy that are in agriculture or 
industry, again because we anticipate economists’ traditional concerns about third forces and 
reverse causation.  Forces affecting education policy may also drive the local economy’s 
comparative advantage in agriculture or industry.
41   
  If all these forces are set aside, what systematic forces will explain the wide differences 
around the country, and how might we quantify the impact of these forces?  While the search for 
reliable numbers on very early American schools continues, we are fortunate to have usable 
county-level census information from the middle of the nineteenth century.  In 1840 and in 1850, 
U.S. towns and counties still differed greatly in those salient features that distinguished the    Page  17 
country as a whole.  They particularly differed in their local distributions of political power. 
While it was necessary to clean and cross-check the underlying census data in a number of ways, 
we have been able to use the ICPSR county-level data files collated by Michael Haines to run 
tests on cross-sections of counties in 1840 and 1850. 
  Having information on both public schools and private schools allows us to compare 
effects on public schooling with effects on total schooling.  Such comparisons reveal the extent 
to which a force that creates more public schooling crowds out private schooling.  On this large 
issue, a clear pattern will stand out.  In most cases, the effect of each featured variable on public 
schooling is about the same as its effect on total schooling, with no net “crowding out.”  This 
striking result is possible because those who gathered our data in the early nineteenth century 
took care to distinguish public and private schooling.
42  
   Some forces that made U.S. counties so different in the scale and character of their 
primary schooling are revealed in Tables 5 and 6.  Noting that some of the measurable forces had 
their impact mainly at the local (county or district) level, while others operated through laws and 
budgets at the state level, we must take care to separate “fixed state effects” from local effects.  
Accordingly, Tables 5 and 6 display only results from regressions that have controlled for fixed 
state effects. We will then take the further step of explaining the state-level effects themselves, to 
extract further information about the underlying structure that shaped education across the land. 
 
Political Voice 1: Voting Rights and the Voting Rate 
 
 
  Our featured political voice variable has two main components: the share of free men 
having the legal right to vote on local schooling issues, and local elites’ dominance over other 
voters. 
  Measuring the first political voice variable, the share of local men having the right to 
vote, is not as straightforward as it might seem.  We use one main proxy measure, and test its 
apparent influence against other measures.  Our main proxy in the 1840 and 1850 samples is the 
share of free men who actually used their vote in a presidential election.
43 Later, using New York 
state data, we will look more directly at the franchise itself, i.e., the shares of men entitled to 
vote.      Page  18 
  We have chosen to focus on the share of men entitled to vote and actually voting, rather 
than on the existence of state laws restricting the vote, because the latter offer less information 
than other scholars have hoped.  The difficulty with binary measures of vote-restricting laws is to 
quantify the degree of restrictiveness.  The laws themselves are too complex to summarize in a 
single restrictiveness index, and historians have found that actual practice varied greatly for any 
given state of the law.
44  Even with consistent application of fixed franchise rules, we would still 
need to know how many in each county actually met the qualifications.  And in cases where the 
laws were suddenly changed, the actual franchise and voting rates moved more slowly. 
  We use the share of free men
45  who actually voted for president as a fair, though 
imperfect, proxy for the right to vote in local fights over schools and taxes.  What share of a 
town or county’s men actually voted on schools is the product of these three ratios: 
 
  (1) The ratio of men entitled to vote for president to those entitled to vote in local 
elections and referenda on school and tax issues.  Fortunately, this ratio was effectively fixed at 
unity.  Historians of local government find that the two rights were much the same in practice.
46   
  (2) The share of all men enfranchised to vote for president.  This key component reflected 
a mixture of the restrictiveness of state franchise law, the local distribution of property holding 
and of taxpaying, and transient individuals’ propensity to meet the residency requirements and to 
register. 
  (3) The willingness to vote, or the share of franchised men that showed up on presidential 
election day. This wavered, over time and across states, with the intensity of the presidential 
race. 
 
  Our voting-share proxy nicely captures the first two components, but the third is more 
problematic.  Were variations in the turnout rate among franchised citizens largely voluntary? If 
so, then the decision to vote or not vote might have been swayed by local attributes that also 
affected the willingness to educate children.  In this case, the voting rate is not so exogenous as 
an influence on education.  Alternatively, it may be that many declined to vote because they felt 
marginalized by the political process or were afraid to reveal their political preferences in an age 
when ballots were not secret.  In this case, non-voting is akin to being denied the right to vote.  
We will later deal with these concerns in a number of ways, but the tests summarized in Tables 5    Page  19 
and 6 tentatively use the county-level voting rate as a measure of the distribution of voting 
rights. 
  The influence of the voting share on support for schools could easily be non-linear.  Our 
tests allow for non-linearity by using a fourth-order polynomial in the voting share, with test 
statistics on the effects of specific changes in voting share.  Here we report the effects of extra 
voting in the middle of the most common, and best-sampled range, from 60 percent of free men 
voting up to 80 percent voting.   
  At face value, the effects of the voting rate look strongly positive in the behavior of 
Northern U.S. counties in 1840 and 1850, as shown at the top of Tables 5 and 6.  An increase 
from 60 percent voting to 80 percent tended to raise a Northern county’s school attendance by 
almost 14 per hundred school-age children in 1840, and by almost 10 percentage points in 1850.  
The same extra voting raised government support by 38 cents per child in 1850, a noticeable 
share of the grand average support levels reported in Table 2 above.  Additional regressions on 
the 1850 data confirm that all of this impact of extra voting took the financial form of extra local 
taxes, rather than state funds or endowments.  These effects were roughly the same for all 
schools as for public schools alone, meaning that extra voting had no effect on private academies 
in the North.  Extra voting, in other words, meant extra local tax support that did not “crowd out” 
any private support in the North.   
  In the South, by contrast, the voting rate had much less effect on enrollments or on 
support per child.  The effects look vaguely positive but not significantly different from zero.  
This null result held in the South even though the shares of whites that voted were as high in the 
South as in the North.   
 
Political Voice 2: Centralized Power in the South 
 
  The South’s lack of county-level response to voting rates derived from its distinctive 
political structure.  To interpret the differences in educational policy between the two regions 
and within the South, let us start with a simple reading of some further county-level results for 
1840 and 1850, before turning to the underlying role of state-level institutions.   
  Looking first at the effects of slavery on white children’s school enrollments, looking at 
the county-level patterns would not reveal any clear relationship of a county’s slave holding to    Page  20 
its white enrollments within a Southern state (Table 5). When we shift from enrollments to 
government financial support for schooling per white child, Table 6 adds an extra twist to the 
influence of local slavery: Among counties within a Southern state, a county’s having more 
slaves meant more government money and more teachers per white child. Perhaps slave owners 
were able to divert state funds to their own children, and to supplement them with private tuition, 
while cutting overall state-level support for education in a way that explains the lower 
educational attainments of Southern whites as a whole.
47  So far, the regression clues suggest the 
sort of elitist imprint of slavery on education policy that past authors have described.
48  A further 
statistical clue can be found in state-level effects in the equations behind Tables 5 and 6. There is 
a general pattern to the fixed state-level effects: It is among states, not among counties, that slave 
holding shows up as a negative influence on the region’s schooling for white children, 
presumably because the slaveholding interest exercised its power at the level of state legislatures. 
  A combination of statistical results and institutional history thus inclines us to the view 
that centralized restraints on political voice in the South held back the schooling of Southern 
white children of modest economic background.  We cannot, however, give zero weight to the 
demand-side counter-argument that lower-income Southern whites wanted less schooling for 
their children and were politically passive for that reason.   
 
The Age Distribution 
 
  Both in the North and in the South, the provision of schooling per child was also affected 
by the age distribution of the local population, in ways that accord with our expectations.  Not 
surprisingly, communities with more school-age children per adult delivered less public and 
private schooling per white child.  Table 5 implied that, for each white man over 20, adding one 
child in the 5-14 age group would cut the enrollment rate, especially in the North. A community 
with more children per adult had a harder time supporting the education of the average child.
49   
  Within the adult population, communities where the adults tend to be older might have 
had two opposing differences in the schooling of their children.  The more commonly imagined 
negative effect turns out to have been offset by a positive effect of an older population, or rather 
a positive effect of the larger environment that an older population represents.    Page  21 
  It is natural to imagine that older adults, who will not be sending more children into the 
school system, would less favorably inclined toward raising taxes for schools.  In 1851, one 
commentator in the New York debate over free schools thought so: “The childless, and those 
whose children have already received their education, deem it a hardship to be obliged to pay for 
the instruction of the children of their neighbors, and consequently vote against any 
appropriation.”
50   Yet the effect of an older adult population is not so clearly negative.   
Combining the men-over-40 results of Tables 5 and 6 suggests that an older population had 
higher enrollments and more teachers, but less government support per child. Overall, we 
tentatively suggest only that any negative lobbying effect of oldsters was apparently offset by the 
fact that an older community tended to inherit more education infrastructure, and more teachers, 
because it was settled earlier.   
 
Cities and Migrants: Cubberley vs. Cubberley? 
 
 Ellwood  Cubberley’s  influential classic, Public Education in the United States, pointed to 
the cities as having both the greatest champions of “free schools” for all and having the greatest 
social problems.  In Cubberley’s view, the “new social problems in the cities,” the rise of 
immigrants, crime, industrialization, pauperism, and family breakdown in the cities convinced 
“two very dissimilar groups of people -- the humanitarians on the one hand and the new city 
laboring classes on the other -- [to unite] in a propaganda for tax-supported schools.” By mid-
century the cities had emerged as the champions of educational progress:  
 
  “[T]he substantial progress in almost every phase of public education during the second 
half of the nineteenth century was made by the cities of our country, while the rural 
districts, often blind to their own best interests, lagged far behind.” 
 
At the level of propaganda, Cubberley was surely correct: Historians have had no difficulty in 
quoting both urban humanitarians and labor spokesmen who favored universal education in the 
cities.
51   
  Yet the quantitative geography of education patterns at mid-century challenges us to re-
interpret the demand and supply of urban schooling in the North.  The regression results of    Page  22 
Tables 5 and 6, along with the simple raw averages shown in Table 3, reveal these contrasts 
between Northern cities and the Northern countryside: 
 
  (a) The cities spent much more government money and private money per pupil and per 
teacher, possibly improving the quality of education, but  
  (b) they built fewer schools and hired fewer teachers per pupil,  
  (c) they had slightly lower enrollments than did rural school districts,  
  (d) rural families paid more in private tuition for their common schools than did those in 
the cities, and  
  (e) the presence of extra foreigners did not raise either enrollments or aid per child.   
 
What was higher in large cities was not the provision of mass public education, but rather a 
greater emphasis on expensive education, involving a mixture of longer school years and fewer, 
more highly paid, teachers. True, the cities subsidized minimalist schools for the very poor, but 
this was a less expensive alternative than universal schooling.  The rural areas “blind to their 
own self interest” were ahead in the enrollment race,
52 topped up their common-school subsidies 
with greater private tuition payments, and hired more teachers per 100 pupils. 
  To reconcile these results with the view of the cities as champions of free schools for all, 
one should start by replacing Cubberley’s statements about the cities with two more durable 
ideas advanced by Cubberley himself in other contexts.  First, he would have done better by 
grouping Northern cities with Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and state further south, in the zone he 
saw as dominated by the “pauper school” idea plus subsidized education for top students.  More 
importantly, he should have explained the urban-rural contrasts in terms of suffrage and political 
voice, a theme he sounded briefly when describing the greater sweep of nineteenth-century 
educational history.
53   
  What we know about the governance of urban school systems before mid-century helps 
to explain why Tables 5 and 6 found a more durable role for the distribution of political voting 
power than for the urban and immigrant variables as such.  Urban school districts were large and 
governed by top professionals with preferences tipped toward expensive schooling for higher-
level students.  In many cities they were appointed rather than elected, and even the elected ones 
answered to a smaller and more established electorate in cities than in small towns.      Page  23 
  Cubberley’s view that cities led the fight for free schools does not square with all his own 
evidence, and he may have misinterpreted the New York State experience that introduced his 
remark about urban leadership.  In the key 1850 referendum, the rural vote against “free schools” 
was actually a vote against an 1849 law that forced rural areas to impose high property tax rates 
to replace the rate bills already being paid by parents, while the city voters faced no such 
burdens.
54 The countryside voted more negatively than the cities on a particular tax formula, and 




  Communities’ demand for schooling and their willingness to pay taxes were probably 
also shaped to some extent by their religion, their national origins, and whether they had a large 
share of migrants from other states. 
  Religious communities could affect schools in at least two ways: by enrolling their 
children, and by lobbying for or against school support. The census of 1850 gives us a chance to 
separate these two roles for membership in 22 major sects, watching their enrollment effects in 
Table 5 and implicit financial support in Table 6.  The first point to note on the effect of religious 
communities is that most of the 22 left no clear imprint on school enrollments or finances in 
either the North or the South, despite a long literary tradition of emphasizing the written Bible as 
a force for education.  Perhaps this was because no religion had the chance to dominate counties, 
states, or nations as much as it did on other continents.
55  Some sects, however, did show general 
patterns in the county-level data.  Congregationalists in the North and Baptists in both regions 
clearly sent their children to public schools, and seemed to hire more public school teachers, than 
other sects.  By contrast, Roman Catholics did not, and they clearly contributed more money to 
private academies than to public schools.  Other sects had mixed influences. 
 
 
V. WHAT WAS BEHIND THE VOTING RATE? 
 
  A number of concerns about the large cross-sections of counties in 1840 and 1850 can be 
addressed with alternative data sets, particularly state-level data and national data featuring    Page  24 
changes between censuses. Here we offer three side-tests on New York state data for 1845, and 
three other tests suggesting that the franchise was indeed an exogenous influence on schooling.   
  New York State’s county-level data offer a closer look at three forces not directly 
measured in the early national censuses.  Table 7 uses the New York census of 1845 to provide 
three extra insights.  First, it is clear in New York that the positive schooling effect of receiving 
extra migrants from other states was transmitted largely by the arrival of New Englanders.  On 
this Yankee influence, quantitative analysis and narrative history now agree.
56  Looking at the 
geography of this effect finds it particularly strong in the far northeastern counties around Lake 
Champlain.  This corner of the state might have been an education backwater were it not for the 
heavy inflows from New England. 
  Second, a reality check on New York data relieves some of our fears about using the 
voting rate as a proxy for voting rights.  Starting from 1795, New York took special statewide 
censuses of the numbers of men legally entitled to vote.  Table 7 uses 1845 data on the numbers 
franchised and gets the same strong positive effects that the larger samples got with the voting-
rate proxy.  Apparently, differences in counties’ voter turnout did not introduce any distortions 
back in Tables 5 and 6.   
  A third use of the New York data takes advantage of that state’s different measures of 
school attendance, as opposed to school enrollments.  Table 7 confirms that the determinants are 
similar for each of these alternative ways of counting students.   
  A remaining concern is that all the results presented thus far may have introduced 
omitted-variable biases by leaning on spatial cross-sections of counties and states.  Do we really 
know that changing the voting laws or changing the distribution of property and income would 
change schooling through their effects on the local balance of political power?  Scholars rightly 
seek tests in which the featured force changed suddenly and exogenously, so that any subsequent 
movement in the dependent variable (here schooling) clearly reflects this sudden change.  We 
have tried three kinds of experiments to test the separate influence of exogenous changes in the 
right to vote.   
  A conventional way to address the fears of omitted variables and reverse causation is to 
find clearly exogenous instruments for the variable suspected of being endogenous, in this case 
the voting rate. The instruments used here are the number of years of residency in the state 
required for voting, these interacted with the immigrant share from other states, the same    Page  25 
residency requirements interacted with the share foreign-born, and the existence of a state 
property requirement for voting.  Instrumenting the voting rate in this way slightly yields the 
same kinds of results as in Tables 5 and 6, but only in the case of Northern enrollments are the 
instrument variables fully valid..
57  For Northern enrollments, at least, the influences in Table 5 
re-emerged with the same signs and significance in the IV equations, and the effect of a shift if 
the voting rate was marginally stronger than in Table 5.   
  Second, a natural experiment arises from New York’s switch to near-universal manhood 
suffrage between 1821 and 1826.  Property requirements for voting were repealed in 1821, and 
taxpaying requirements were repealed in 1826, leaving residency as the main requirement.
58  
Over that four year span the share of adult men who obtained their formal right to vote jumped 
from 66 percent to 83 percent.  In 1827-1828 and again in 1832 the state legislature raised its 
common-school subsidies so much that by 1835 their real value per child 5-16 was more than 
double that of the year 1820.  We do not know which counties’ representatives in Albany voted 
for these major expansion of funds, but we do know that counties where the franchise was most 
extended tended to be those counties where common-school enrollments advanced fastest in this 
period. The aftermath of New York’s franchise liberalization of 1821-1826 at least hints at 
confirmation of the findings presented earlier on the basis of national census samples.  
  Finally, we were able to use changes from 1840 to 1850 in a nation-wide sample of over 
800 counties to test for the effects of changes in voting rights and voting rates on changes in 
enrollments, both in public schools and in all schools over that decade.  This differences-in-
differences approach allowed us to purge all purely fixed differences between counties and 
between states.  Once again the voting rate showed a strong impact on enrollment rates, both for 
public schools and for all schools.   
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND AGENDA 
 
  It is much easier to explain the early onset of public schooling in America if one focuses 
on the link between political voice and support for funding schools.  Part of that political voice 
was channeled through the right to vote. On this front, our findings support the suggestion that 
Engerman and Sokoloff derived from their study of state-level correlations: “The movement for    Page  26 
the establishment of public schools supported by local property taxes closely and successfully 
followed the expansion of the suffrage, which strongly suggests that the latter did indeed make a 
difference for policy.”
59  This paper has argued that the franchise, and the broader concept of 
political voice, helps to explain both America’s head start in enrollments and the differences 
among communities within this country.   
  The wider distribution of political voice inclined many counties in the rural North (and 
upper Canada) toward higher enrollments, though not toward high expenditures per pupil.  In this 
respect the rural North differed from Northern cities, from the South, and from England, all of 
which had respectable expenditures per pupil but lower enrollment rates.  
  If the political voice effects seem to have been so strong in the antebellum era, what has 
happened to them since the Civil War?  By the twentieth century they should have faded away, 
as suffrage became more universal and Southern planters and slaveholders’ grip was weakened.  
The differences in politics and education did indeed fade away gradually, both for the North and 
for Southern whites. The lingering post-bellum exception was the effect of Jim Crow voting laws 
after the Civil War.  As Robert Margo has shown, differences in black voting rights helped to 
explain much of the differences between Southern states in their degree of racial discrimination 
in school policy.
60  Only from the 1930s on did blacks’ education converge clearly and rapidly 
toward that of whites.   
  For Southern whites, both their education and the region’s distinctive institutions 
converged very slowly toward the national standard.  It took a century and a half for their 
enrollments to catch up.  Political changes must have helped.  Planters lost relative influence, 
both in the aftermath of the Civil War and in the region’s industrialization across the twentieth 
century.  The South’s curious preference for more centralized government also faded gradually.  
As of 1902, it still existed to some extent, and it still correlated with lower public spending on 
education.  Local school districts controlled only 13 percent of public education spending in the 
South versus 35 percent in the non-South, while state governments controlled 33 percent in the 
South and only 22 percent elsewhere, the remainder being controlled by county government.  By 
1982, the differences had nearly vanished.  All states have delegated the task of spending on 
primary and secondary education to local governments, though some still control that spending 
with statewide regulations.
61    Thus convergence toward decentralized government and 
democracy has accompanied convergence toward high enrollment rates.     Page  27 
  Where should the research frontier be pushed hardest in the political economy of early 
American schooling?  Our view is that we need more detailed research on how the decisions 
were made and how they affected schooling at the town level.  Part of the extra research can be 
econometric, and it can include the use of town-level data, which are available but take time to 
process.  Our main plea, however, is for studies of how the decision-making process really 
worked in town meetings and in state legislatures.  We know that the issue of schooling was 
hotly contested, but we still need to learn how the crucial political pressures were applied.      Page  28 
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Table 1.  School Enrollments per 100 Children Ages 5-14   
  in the United States and Europe, 1830-1850   
            
  Public primary schools only    Public plus private schools 
 1830 1840 1850  1830 1840 1850 
USA, whites    50.5 67.1     54.9  72.2 
USA, whites in --               
  6 Northeast states    96.4 98.7   105.8 103.6  105.5 
2 Southern states    16.6 29.9   20.7 20.9  34.6 
USA, all    45.3 56.7     49.2  61.0 
            
England-Wales       27.4 35.1  49.8 
Scotland     57.2      59.2 
Belgium       34.6 52.6  54.9 
Italy 2.8    12.4        
France  39.8 36.7   38.8 51.3  51.5 
Norway 68.5  67.1 64.0        
Prussia 68.7  73.6 72.2   69.5 74.4  73.0 
            
            
Sources and notes to Table 1:            
The sources are the 1840 and 1850 US censuses plus Lindert (2004, vol. 2, App. 
    Table A.1) for non-US, and Fishlow (1966a, Table 1) for extrapolations to 1830.   
The six Northeast states = ME, NH, MA, CT, RI, and NY.     
The two Southern states = KY and VA.           
For these eight states, we took Fishlow’s (1966a, Table 1) ratio of 1830   
    to 1840 enrollment rates.              
The U.S. private enrollments include a small number of secondary-school    
    “academy” students.                Page  33 
 
  Table 2.   U.S. Education in 1850, North versus South 
            
     Public    
  A. Fifteen Northern States  schools Academies Colleges Total 
Funds per pupil ($ per year)         
  Endowment (fed., state, & priv.)  0.05 1.07 17.59  0.19 
  Taxation (mainly local)  1.50 0.09 0.00  1.41 
  Public funds (mainly state)  0.66 0.49 1.66  0.66 
  Private tuition & other  0.24 14.15 42.41  1.19 
   Total  2.45 15.80 61.66  3.45 
            
Teachers and enrollments         
  Funds per teacher ($ per year)  93 396 1052  127 
  Teachers per 100 pupils  2.6 4.0 5.9  2.7 
  Pupils per free child 5-14  0.82 0.05 0.004  0.87 
  Pupils per free child 5-19  0.58 0.03 0.003  0.61 
            
  B. Fifteen Southern States        
Funds per pupil ($ per year)         
  Endowment (fed, state, & priv.)  0.08 1.16 15.69  0.51 
  Taxation (mainly local)  0.84 0.00 1.29  0.72 
  Public funds (mainly state)  1.23 0.37 13.37  1.31 
  Private tuition & other  2.52 18.44 50.69  5.73 
   Total  4.67 19.97 81.03  8.27 
            
Teachers and enrollments         
  Funds per teacher ($ per year)  141 427 1315  231 
  Teachers per 100 pupils  3.3 4.7 6.2  3.6 
  Pupils per free child 5-14  0.32 0.06 0.007  0.38 
  Pupils per free child 5-19  0.23 0.04 0.005  0.28 
      
Source and notes to Table 2: 
The source is the ICPSR electronic compilation of the 1850 census. 
The fifteen Northern states are CT, IL, IN, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,  
NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, VT, and WI. 
The fifteen Southern states are AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, Missouri,  
NC, SC, TN, TX and VA. 
The enrollments are "gross" enrollments, including all pupils of any age, not just in the  
  age range at which the type of school is primary targeted.   
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  Table 3.   U.S. Education in 1850, Urban and Rural Counties    
                
      Public schools only      All primary & secondary 
     Urban Rural Urban Rural   Urban  Rural  Urban Rural
     North North South South North North South South
Funds per pupil ($ per year)                   
 
Endowment (fed, state, & 
private) 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.07   0.32  0.07  1.51 0.16
  Taxation (mainly local)  4.31 1.19 4.00 0.71   3.71  1.14  2.21 0.61
  Public funds (mainly state)  1.01 0.62 2.63 1.17   0.93  0.62  1.46 1.08
  Private tuition & other  0.13 0.26 2.75 2.51   2.89  0.75  11.24 4.53
   Total  5.50 2.11 9.62 4.46   7.83  2.58 16.43 6.38
                     
Teachers  and  enrollments            
 
All funds per teacher ($ 
per year)  304 78 416 133   378  93  499 180
  Public funds per teacher  294 67 286 56   224  63  112 48
  Teachers per 100 pupils  1.8 2.7 2.3 3.4   2.1  2.8  3.3 3.5
 
Teachers per 100 free 
children 5-14  1.0 2.3 0.5 1.1   1.4  2.5  1.3 1.3
  Pupils per free child 5-14  0.58 0.86 0.22 0.33   0.67  0.90  0.39 0.38
  Pupils per free child 5-19  0.39 0.61 0.15 0.24   0.45  0.63  0.27 0.27
                   
Total expenditures ($ mill.)  1.51 5.26 0.23 2.49   2.50  6.72  0.70 4.11
Total public expend. ($ mill.)  1.46 4.51 0.16 1.05   1.48  4.58  0.16 1.09
Total teachers (1000s)  5.0 67.7 0.5 18.8   6.6  72.2  1.4 22.8
Total enrolled pupils (1000s)  275 2495 24 558   319  2606  43 644
 
Source and notes to Table 3:          
The source is the ICPSR electronic compilation of the 1850 census.   
North and South refer to the 15-state regions covered in Table 2.     
The 14 urban (over 2,500 population) counties of the North:     
  Middlesex and Suffolk MA; Providence RI; Essex NJ; Albany,    
  Erie, Monroe, Kings, New York, and Rensselaer in NY;     
  Allegheny and Philadelphia in PA;  Cook IL; and Hamilton OH.   
The six urban counties of the South:           
  St. Louis MO, Henrico VA, Orleans LA, Charleston SC, Jefferson KY, and Baltimore MD. 
All other counties are called rural here.           
As in Table 2, the enrollments are "gross" enrollments, including all pupils of any age,  
  not just in the age range at which the type of school is primary targeted.   
Public expenditures here equal taxes and "public funds", but not endowment income,  
  which is harder to divide between public and private sources.     
The data generally refer to the school year 1849-1850.        Page  35 
 
  Table 4.   The Cost of Primary Schooling and Teachers, Relative to the 
   
Earnings of a Common Laborer in the U.S. and England, 
1830s-1850s 
 
      
Panel (A.) School fees: The number of weeks' earnings for a non-agricultural 
  laborer required to pay for a child's schooling 
      
(1.) New York State, average common school 1841-1842 
     18  weeks 
  Public funds   0.22 
  Private tuition (rate bills)  0.16 
 Total  costs    0.39 
      
(2.) Manchester, England, 1834 (private cost = total cost) 
     18  weeks 
  In 230 dame schools (reading, needlework)  0.40 
  In 116 common boys' schools  0.83 
  In 63 common girls' schools  0.94 
  In 86 evening schools  0.71 
 School-weighted  average  0.62 
      
(3.) In 971 reporting English and Welsh schools, 1858 
      per ave. annual attendance 
 Government  grants  0.17 
  Fees paid by parents  0.41 
  Other income of schools  0.57 
  Total income (cost) of schools  1.15 
      
Panel (B.) Teachers' wages, relative to the earnings of common labor 
      
(1.) Average Northern U.S. school teachers   
  Male teachers Female teachers All teachers, weighted 
1841 1.09 0.60 0.75 
1841-1850 1.04 0.58 0.72 
1851 1.07 0.61 0.74 
1851-1860 1.26 0.72 0.88 
1861 1.29 0.75 0.91    Page  36 
 
      
   Table 4, continued   
(2.) Manchester, England, 1834/1835   
In 230 dame schools (reading + needlework)  0.45 
In 116 common boys' schools  2.14 
In 63 common girls' schools  1.39 
In 86 evening schools    0.66 
School-weighted average  1.00 
      
(3.) Staffordshire and Warwickshire Charity Schools, England 1827-1861 
   1827 1.59 
   1835 2.08 
   1851 1.81 
   1861 2.12 
      
Sources and notes to Table 4:  
School fees, Northern U.S.:  New York State Superintendent for Common Schools, 
  Annual Reports to the State Legislature, divided by the average 
  laborer's wage for Northern states, 1841, from Burgess (1920, p. 71). 
School fees in Manchester 1834: Gt. Britain, House of Commons, "Education in England 
  and Wales - Select Committee Report with Minutes of Evidence." 
  Sessional Papers, 1835 (465), vol. VII, pp. 111-112. 
Teachers' wages and laborers' wages in the Northern U.S., 1841-1861: 
  Burgess (1920, pp. 32-33, 71).  We have weighted Burgess's separate wage rates for 
  rural versus urban and male versus female teachers by the 1860 non-South 
  employment weights in Perlman and Margo (2001, p. 21). 
Teachers' wages in Manchester 1834 are from the same pages of the 1835 Sessional Papers
  cited above.  These are divided by the weekly earnings of non-agricultural common  
  laborers used by Williamson (1982, the 2L series). 
Teachers' weekly wages in Staffordshire and Warwickshire charity schools are from  
  Williamson (1982, series 11H versus 2L).   
School fees for England and Wales 1858 are from Great Britain, Report of the     
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the State of Popular Education in England. 
  House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 2794-I, 1861.   
The 18-week school year was the typical attendance in New York State in 1841-1842. 
  Manchester in 1834 could have had a similar attendance, given the share of dame 
  schools and evening schools.  The specially sampled English and Welsh public  
  schools in 1858 may have had an atypically long school year to qualify for 
  annual grants based on the number of students attending 176 days. 
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Table 5.   Influences on School Enrollments in U.S. Counties, 1840 and 1850        
                          
  Enrollments per white child in the 5-14 age group    Enrollments per white child in the 5-14 age group   
  Public common schools             All schools (pre-tertiary)           
Region North    North  South   South   North   North   South   South   
Year 1840    1850  1840   1850   1840   1850   1840   1850   
Raising the voting share --                   
from 60% to 80%  0.136 **  0.097 * 0.026   -0.016   0.143 **  0.095 *  0.034 * -0.0043   
  (0.051)   (0.047)   (0.015)   (0.026)   (0.052)   (0.054)   (0.016)   (0.026)  
Slaves per white man       -0.0001   -0.0022       0.009 ** 0.005   
       (0.003)   (0.004)       (0.003)   (0.004)  
Children 5-14  -0.341  **  -0.409 **  -0.150 ** -0.021   -0.368 **  -0.439 **  -0.193 ** -0.081   
  (0.089)   (0.115)   (0.030)   (0.064)   (0.090)   (0.114)   (0.033)   (0.068)  
Share of men over 40  1.208  *  1.485 ** 0.197   0.113  1.351 **  1.577 ** 0.292   0.238   
  (0.476)    (0.479)  (0.137)   (0.315)   (0.484)   (0.474)  (0.149)   (0.313)   
-3.884  **  -2.682 *  0.320 ** -0.153   -3.704 **  -2.794 **  0.288 * -0.141   Free coloreds per white 
(0.871)   (1.073)   (0.102)   (0.197)   (0.884)   (1.063)   (0.112)   (0.195)  
Urban share  -0.0017   -0.034   -0.103   -0.042   0.102   0.063   0.101   0.057  
  (0.119)   (0.117)   (0.059)   (0.109)   (0.121)   (0.115)   (0.065)   (0.108)  
   0.272     -0.068     0.296     -0.025   Migrants from other 
states     (0.164)     (0.090)     (0.163)     (0.090)  
Foreigners     -0.139     0.028     -0.153     0.226  
     (0.247)     (0.254)     (0.245)     (0.253)  
  bapt= +  **  bapt= +  *  bapt= +  **  bapt = +  * 
 cong=+  *              cong=+  **  chris=  + * 
Church accommod’ns 
per capita, + and - 
effects 
    tunk= +  *    tunk= +  *     
                  
Number of counties  452   518   655   718   452   517   655   716  
Number of zeroes  18   15   71   34   17   13   60   22  
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Sources and Notes to Table 5:             
The main data sources are Haines, ICPSR02896-v2, 2005; and Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, ICPSR08611-v1, 2006. 
Our edited data sets are available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/graduate/sgo and 
http://econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder. 
Coefficient standard errors in parentheses.           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
The regression type is tobit, censored from below at zero. All equations are highly significant.       
The South consists of all states in the band running from Missouri through Kentucky, Virginia, Maryland, and 
Delaware, 
    plus states further south, but excluding Texas.  The North consists of all states north of this band.   
Children 5-14 = White children in this age band, per white male over 20.           
Share of men over 40 = white males 40+ / white males 20+, a measure that reflects the age of a community and its  
    infrastructure.  This demographic variable also tends to be a positive influence on average wealth.   
Urban share = the share of the county's population living in cities of 2,500 or more inhabitants.     
Religious membership = religious accommodations (seating capacity) of all kinds, per capita.       
All regressions are also controlled for fixed state effects, geography variables, and (for 1850) the effects of church 
    accommodations (seating capacity) per white population for 22 religious groups defined by the 1850 census 
    and by Michael Haines's ICPSR code books.                   
The religious groups whose accommodations has significant effects are bapt = baptist, cong = congrationalist, 
    chris = Christian (not elsewhere classified), and tunk = Tunker churches.             
The geography variables are binaries for: The county is on the Great Lakes, on the Atlantic       
or the Gulf Coast, on the Mississippi, or on the Ohio River.               
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Table 6.   Influences on School Support, U.S. Counties in 1850        
                        
  Teachers or dollars per white child in the 5-14 age group         
  Public common schools            All schools (pre-tertiary)       
  Teachers    Gov’t funds  All funds   Teachers    Gov’t funds  All funds  
Panel A. South                         
The effect of raising the voting share --              
from 60% to 80%  -0.0011   0.23   0.15    -0.0009    0.10   0.43  
  (0.0007)   (0.21)   (0.24)   (0.0007)    (0.22)   (0.38)  
Slaves per white man  0.0002   0.40 **  0.47
*
*   0.0006  **  0.42 **  0.67 ** 
  (0.0001)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.0001)    (0.04)   (0.06)  
-0.0001   0.62   0.30    -0.0026    0.35   -1.95 *  Children 5-14 as a share 
of pop.  (0.0018)   (0.54)   (0.60)   (0.0018)    (0.55)   (0.89)  
Share of men over 40  -0.0030   -1.82   -2.07    0.0181  *  -1.75   4.39  
  (0.0030)   (2.59)   (3.11)   (0.0090)    (2.69)   (4.61)  
Free coloreds per white  0.0060   1.28   1.61    0.0050    2.04   3.98  
  (0.0054)   (1.56)   (1.83)   (0.0056)    (1.63)   (2.58)  
Urban share  -0.0030   -0.61   0.60    0.0032    -0.60   3.34 ** 
  (0.0030)   (0.88)   (1.00)   (0.0031)    (0.91)   (1.57)  
-0.0006   1.05   0.09    0.0004    1.51  0.27   Migrants from other 
states  (0.0025)   (0.73)   (0.86)   (0.0026)    (0.76)   (1.34)  
Foreigners  -0.0004   4.90 *  3.20    0.0075    6.49 **  7.81 * 
  (0.0070)   (2.07)   (2.40)   (0.0072)    (2.14)   (3.71)  
Church accommodations  bapt = + * bapt= + ** (none) bapt = +  ** luth = + *  (none)  
per capita, + and - effects  free = + * luth = + *  presb = +  ** bapt = - *   
  presb = + * presb= - *  unit = +  **   
                          
Number of counties  719   724   675    719    724   581  
Number of zeroes  34   136   34    22    128   22  
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Table 6.   Influences on School Support, U.S. Counties in 1850, Continued     
  Teachers or dollars per white child in the 5-14 age group         
  Public common schools            All schools (pre-tertiary)       




funds   Teachers    Gov’t  funds
All 
funds   
Panel B. North                       
Raising the voting share                
from 60% to 80%  0.0034 *  0.38 *  0.36 *   0.0034  *  0.39 **  0.57 * 
  (0.0013)   (0.16)   (0.18)   (0.0013)    (0.17)   (0.23)  
Children 5-14  -0.008 *  -1.13 **  -1.47 **   -0.010  **  -1.28 **  -1.81 ** 
  (0.003)   (0.39)   (0.45)   (0.0032)    (0.40)   (0.58)  
Share of men over 40  0.069 **  -1.34   -3.68 *   0.074  **  -0.95   -2.02  
  (0.014)   (1.61)   (1.83)    (0.014)    (1.69)   (2.34)  
Free coloreds per white  -0.035   5.33   4.26    -0.027    5.15   4.33  
  (0.030)   (3.59)   (4.06)    (0.030)    (3.75)   (5.11)  
Urban share  -0.007 *  0.94 *  0.72    -0.0040    1.03 *  1.85 ** 
  (0.003)   (0.39)   (0.44)   (0.0033)    (0.41)   (0.55)  
Migrants from other 
states  0.019 **  0.40   -0.16    0.020  **  0.55   1.16  
  (0.005)   (0.53)   (0.61)   (0.0046)    (0.56)   (0.77)  
Foreigners  -0.0005   -0.37   -1.15    -0.0010    -0.67   -0.62  
  (0.0069)   (0.83)   (0.99)   (0.0070)    (0.87)   (1.25)  
Church accommodations  cong = + **  unit= + **  presb= + *   cong = +  **  rcath= + *  episc= + ** 
per capita, + and - effects  union = + **    unit = + **  union = +   **  unit = + *  presb=+ * 
  univs = + *       univs = +  *    rcath=+ ** 
                 unit = + ** 
                
Number of counties  522   526   520    520    526   488  
No. of zeroes  15   22   15    13    22   13  
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Notes to Table 6:                    
See also the notes to Table 5.                      
* significant at 5%; ** significant  at  1%             
School receipts of "government funds" consisted of endowment income, local tax support, and 
    other public funds (subsidies), here expressed in dollars per white child 5-14 rather than per pupil. 
Receipts of “all funds” include these receipts from government plus receipts from     
all “other” sources, consisting mainly of private tuition.               
The religious groups whose accommodations has significant effects are cong = Congregationalist,  
    epis = episcopalian, free = Free Churches, presb = Presbyterian, rcath = Roman Catholic,  
    union = Union churches, unit = Uniterians, and univs = Universalists.         
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  Table 7.   Influences on School Participation,    
    the 59 Counties of New York State in 1845 
         
    Public common schools     All schools 








   Enrollment attendance
time in the 
year 
time in the 
year
    
Percent franchised to vote  1.69 0.83 1.88 1.36
   (0.33) (0.23) (0.29) (0.26)
Children 5-14 as % of pop’n  1.14 0.34 1.00  -0.63
   (1.12) (0.78) (0.99)  (0.88)
Share of men who are over 40  27.27 -20.15 -47.12  -59.43
   (62.06) (43.50) (54.64)  (48.66)
Urban share    -0.075 -0.032 -0.011  0.075
   (0.098) (0.069) (0.086)  (0.077)
Percentage of New York State population that immigrated --   
 from  New  England 1.08 0.80 1.20 1.20
   (0.36) (0.25) (0.32) (0.28)
  from other U.S. states 0.81 0.65 0.47  0.74
   (0.62) (0.44) (0.55)  (0.49)
  from other countries 0.41 0.16 0.42  0.10
   (0.30) (0.21) (0.26)  (0.23)
Constant   -107.99 -27.22 -88.79  9.04
   (51.70) (36.24) (45.52)  (40.53)
          
Adjusted R squared  .629 .455 .674  .536
Std. error of OLS estimate  11.45 8.03 10.09  8.98
Mean of dependent variable  86.1 52.8 89.9  100.02
          
Notes to Table 7:        
The source is the New York State Census of 1845.     
See also the notes to Table 5.         
The age-group and student denominators include free colored children, unlike Tables 5-6. 
    Free coloreds were 1.7 percent of the state population.   
Standard errors are in the parentheses.        Page  43 
 
 
Source and notes to Figure 1: The Annual Report of the New York Superintendent of Common 
Schools, 1820-1855.  The shares for 1796-1798 and the rate bills for 1814-1825 are from a set of 
“conjectures” offered in the 1825 report.     Page  44 
 
 
Sources and notes to Figure 2:  All price series have been converted into metric physical units, 
and both price and wage series were converted into silver money units. The Massachusetts series 
are those of Carroll Wright, and the England series are those of Gregory Clark.  Both sets, and 
the real wage comparisons graphed here, are downloadable as Excel files from 
http://gpih.ucdavis.edu. Each real wage divides the nominal silver wage for 30 days per year by 
the local cost of an eight-commodity annual consumption “bundle” consisting of 135.1 kg of 
wheat flour, 26 kg of beef, 5.2 kg of butter, 4.33 dozen eggs, 1.8 kg sugar, one pair of shoes, 2.6 
kg of soap, and 2.6 kg of tallow candles.  The bundle is patterned after the Strasbourg 1746-1754 
bundle reported by Robert C. Allen and co-authors in the first working paper on the same 
internet site, but with the addition of sugar based on the diets of poor English workers 1787-
1796.    Page  45 
APPENDIX A. 
A Simple Model of Public School Finance, 
Featuring Budget Votes 
When Public Schools Get Mixed Public-Private Financing  
 
 
  We seek to model first a household’s schooling preferences and then a decisive voter’s 
tax-and-subsidy preferences, to predict influences on tax support and school attendance.  The 
model is kept as simple as possible, while incorporating heterogeneous preferences and a few 
essentials of school finance. The model features two kinds of decisionmakers.  First, parents and 
prospective parents choose how much public schooling each child should have, given the offical 
length of the school year and the quality of the local public school.  Second, a decisive voter 
chooses not only the amount of schooling for his own child but also the school budget and the 
length of the school year.  
  
I. The Demand for Schooling in a Household with Children 
  A household utility function that is particularly handy in its tractability and relative 
realism is the ith individual’s Stone-Geary function of the form 
 
(1) Ui = (Ci – Cio)
α
 (Si – Sio) 
1-α
, where  
 
Ci = consumption of everything but primary schooling, with Cio being its positive necessary 
minimum subsistence level;  
α = a preference-based coefficient for the ith household (we omit the i-subscript); and 
Si = the share of the average school-age year that each child spends in public school, with Sio 
being a base level of schooling that could be positive or negative, depending on 
preferences.  We consider a negative sign more realistic, since it is consistent with the 
possibility of choosing zero public schooling, which was frequently observed in this 
historical period. 
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Note that the schooling demand being modeled here is a demand for public schooling.  The 
demand for private schooling is separate and is folded into general consumption (C) here, to 
simplify the algebra.   
  For mathematical convenience, and without changing any aggregate implications, we 
convert the Stone-Geary utility function into its logged form: 
 
(2) lnUi = α ln(Ci – Cio) + (1-α) ln(Si – Sio) 
 
The consumer (couple) maximizes this utility with respect to consumption (Ci) and per-child 
schooling (Si), with all children being treated equally by their parents.   
  The income constraint plays its usual crucial role.  Full-time income (Yi) consists of wage 
and property income components: Yi  =  Wi + r PL Li, where Wi is the family’s full-time labor 
earning power, r is the current-year rate of return on “land” (representing real estate, or taxable 
property), PL is the purchase price (and assessed price) of land, and Li is this ith household’s 
holdings of land.   
  The household spends its income on consumption, on schooling above the subsidized 
level, and on taxes, so that the household’s budget constraint is  
 
(3) Wi  +  r PL Li  -  Ci  - ni φ (Si – s)  - ni wc Si  -  t PL Li  ≥  0. 
 
There is no pc price term in front of the real consumption term Ci because we normalize the price 
of consumer goods to be unity.   
 Here  ni = the number of children of school age,
1 and φ is the fee cost of a full year’s 
normal public schooling, from both private and public funds.  Institutionally, s was the share of 
the year for which the fees were paid by taxpayers.  Typically taxes covered a number of weeks 
of school, say twelve weeks, and parents wanting fuller schooling during the year paid the the 
rest with rate bills.  The annual wage rate on child labor is wc.  Having a child go to school 
deducts the child’s labor time, as well as the school fees, from the family’s potential earnings.   
                                                 
1 This appendix views the number of children as exogenous.  The model could be extended to 
make fertility decisions simultaneous with schooling decisions.      Page  47 
  The local government also has a budget constraint.  For simplicity, we will assume that 
school subsidies are the only kind of local government expenditure and a proportional property 
(land) tax is the only source of government revenue.  Ignoring any administrative costs, the 
budget constraint says that total revenue must cover total school expenditures: 
 





where PLLall is the assessed value of all real estate (quality-adjusted price PL times quantity Lall), 
and N is the locality’s total number of children attending common schools anytime during the 
year.  We will use Equation (4) later, to link the tax rate to the level of schooling and to model 
the decisive voter’s self-interest.   
  We deal first with an interior solution in which the household demands more schooling 
days than the subsidized share s, and buys the extra (Si – s) per child by paying rate bills 
(tuition).  For this interior solution, the Lagrangian is  
 
(5) V = α ln(Ci – Cio) + (1-α) ln(Si – Sio)  
  +   λ [Wi  +  r PL Li  -  Ci  - ni φ (Si – s)  - ni wc Si  -  t PL Li] 
  









− psλ = 0
  
 
Here the private price of schooling ps is the sum of the opportunity cost of the child’s time in 
school plus the private payments of any “rate bills” (tuition) beyond what is subsidized by 
taxpayers: 
 
(6) ps  = ni wc  +   ni φ    Page  48 
 
We use these first-order conditions to derive the Marshallian demands for schooling and 
consumption in this interior-solution case where the household reaches a level of schooling that 













⎥ + Si0 
 
Collecting all the Si terms yields the demand equation for public school attendance: 
 
(8) Si = (1−α)









The bracketed numerator is simply the full-time income left over after the minimum subsistence 
consumption has been met, and the bracketed denominator is the price of extra rate-bill 
schooling per child.  The equation translates thus: The share of discretionary income spent on 
public schooling, at the observed real private price of that schooling, is shaped by the 
individual’s relative taste for schooling (1-α and Si0). 
  The partial derivatives of public-school attendance with respect to the exogenous 
parameters correspond to intuition.  Raising any component of income (Wi, Li, r, or PL) has a 
positive effect, meaning that being richer leads to more demand for schooling beyond what taxes 
will cover.  That might not be obvious at first in the case of Li, since having more property 
means paying more tax as well as getting more property return.  Yet the tax was less than the 
return (r > t), as a positive valuation of property (PL > 0) requires, so more property means more 
parental demand for schools.  By contrast, the schooling level per child is negatively affected by 
having more children, or by a higher local wage rate for school-age children. 
  Of particular interest is the effect of raising the school subsidy on different individuals’ 
demand for schooling.  The effect is not necessarily positive, since the higher subsidy must be 
paid for with higher taxes.  The partial derivative of attendance with respect to the share of the 
school year covered by taxes is:    Page  49 
 








⎥  .   
 
The sign of this effect depends on the relationship of relative family size to relative property: 
 
sign (∂Si/∂s) = sign (ni/N  -  Li/Lall),  
 
which is positive for those having relatively more children and relatively less property.  That is, 
raising the subsidy to schooling will raise attendance by children of families that are bigger 
and/or less propertied.  Those with smaller families and greater-than-average property will 
experience a net loss because their taxes will be raised by more than their use of subsidized 
schools, leading them to demand less public schooling for their children.  Overall, a higher 
subsidy will make schooling more equal.   
  Raising the cost of public schooling of given quality (raising φ), e.g. by having public-
school teachers become more expensive, would affect the same two groups the same way as 
raising the subsidy rate.  That is, it would encourage public-school attendance by children from 
larger and poorer families, but discourage it among children of smaller and richer families, again 
making schooling more equal.  
  So far we have focused on the key group with sufficient demand for schooling to pay rate 
bills for extra schooling beyond what is subsidized (the interior solution with Si > s).  Other 
groups will behave differently.  Moving down the scale of relative demand for schooling, the 
next group would be those whose demand was sufficient only to utilize the tax-paid part of the 
school year (Si = s), because they perceive the private benefits of extra school to be somewhere 
between the opportunity cost of child labor and this plus the cost of private schooling (between 
wc and (wc + φ)). This group’s attendance will not vary in response to small movements in any 
parameter, except for an increase in the subsidy.  A third group would be those wanting less 
schooling than what taxes pay for (0 < Si < s).  This group would respond to most parameters in 
the same manner as the group demanding more than the subsidized share.  It too would raise 
attendance in response to any income variable, cut attendance either if the child wage rate rose or 
if schools became more costly. There is one difference, however, between the responses of this    Page  50 
lower-demand group (0 < Si < s) and the higher-demand group (Si > s). If the general subsidy (s) 
is raised along with the tax rate, members of this lower-demand group having any property 
would respond by cutting school attendance because the higher tax would be a pure income loss 
for them. Those with no property will be completely unaffected. A fourth group is the one with 
so little taste for schooling that they consume zero of it. For this group, as for the second group, 
parameter shifts will do nothing to school attendance.   
  The aggregate responses of school attendance to changes in market and policy parameters 
will be a mixture of the responses of these four groups. The functional form of the aggregate 
response is uncertain, but the signs of these responses are likely to resemble the high-demand 
first group, which actually paid some rate bills (Si > s).  
 
 
II. Voter Preferences Regarding Public School Subsidy and Property Tax 
 
  Our portrayal of the influence of voting and political voice on the tax support for schools, 
and thus on the amount and distribution of school attendance, proceeds in two main steps. First, 
we show how a voter’s preferences regarding property tax rate and a school subsidy would align 
with his self-interest as a taxpayer and a parent.
2 This optimization closely follows the household 
model just introduced, though the individual is now free to shape public school finance as well as 
his own child’s education. Second, we will use the clear predictions of this optimization to 
suggest how education finance would have been driven by the distribution of the extension of 
political voice in such a setting where public schools mixed public and private money.   
  A voter’s optimization is the same problem already visited, except that the household 
now chooses how to vote on s and t as well as on how much schooling their children should 
have. We posit the same logged utility function as in Equation (2) above, sticking for now to the 
case in which the voter of interest has children.  This time, however, the household budget 
constraint is different.  With the freedom to set the tax rate t and the subsidized share of the 
school year (s), a decisive ith voter can set s equal to his demand for schooling per child (Si), and 
                                                 
2 We set aside the case of the childless voter who does not care about schooling the children of 
others.  Clearly, the greater the share of such voters, the lower the taxes for schools, and our 
econometric tests will incorporate this effect within the influence of the child/adult ratio.      Page  51 
push through a result that avoids his paying any rate bills, so that Si = s.   The household budget 
constraint is therefore a variant of Equation (3) above, specifically 
 
(10) Wi  +  r PL Li  -  Ci  - ni wc s  -  s φ N Li/Lall  ≥  0. 
 
This formulation has used the government budget balance from Equation (4) to state the tax 
burden on this individual as a function of the school subsidy itself, eliminating the tax rate t.
3  A 
derivation like that used above implies that the voter will prefer to subsidize public primary 
schools up to his own demand for public schooling.  Setting Si = s slightly changes the 
Lagrangian to 
 
(11) V = α ln(Ci – Cio) + (1-α) ln(s – Sio)  
  +   λ [Wi  +  r PL Li - Ci  - ni wc s  -  s φ N Li/Lall] 
 








− λ[niwc + φNLi /Lall]= 0
  
 
Solving for the subsidized share of the public school year yields 
 
(12) s= (1−α)
Wi + rPLLii −Ci0








                                                 
3 The decisive voter might consider the possible reverse influence of schooling-cum-taxes (s) on 
property values, as Charles Tiebout had envisioned migrants’ doing.  This effect could be 
incorporated into the model by making PL an inverted-U function of s, to reflect the fact that 
there is a most efficient level of tax-based schooling.  We set aside such algebra here, and only 
note that it would make the decisive voter choose levels of s closer to the property-value peak of 
the inverted U than he would if there were no such feedback to PL.   
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That is, the preferred subsidy share depends on the voter’s tastes for schooling (1-α and αSi0), 
his discretionary income above a bare subsistence consumption level, and a private price deflator 
specific to public schooling.   
  The parametric influences on the rate of public school subsidy resemble the influences on 
a household’s decisions about school attendance. The greater his gross household income, the 
more a voter favors a longer subsidized school year and a bigger budget.  On the other hand, his 
preferred budget per child would be smaller, the greater is his opportunity cost in terms of child 
labor (niwc),or the total school cost per child (φ), or the average number of children in all families 
(N).  This last effect suggests that adding disenfranchised immigrants, or having more children 
per family, lowers the budget per child. 
  The partial derivative of greatest interest here is the one that is the most complex 
algebraically:  How is the decisive voter’s choice of s affected by his owning more taxable real 
estate (Li) relative to the holdings of others in the same locality? To ease the task of viewing a 







Wi + rPLLi −Ci0
niwc + φNLi /Lall
 
Calling the whole right-hand denominator ps and differentiating with respect to the voter’s 










Expanding on the definition of ps in the numerator alone yields a cancellation of two terms in the 











rPLniwc −(Wi −Ci0)φN /Lall
ps
2  
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The crucial result is the sign of the unfriendly-looking numerator on the right-hand side.  















⎥   











⎥   
 
The right-hand term is likely to have values like ten percent.  In the case of antebellum America, 
this likelihood stems from the school tax rates and the rates of return on property.  The school tax 
rates on assessed property value tended to by around five mills (0.05), and if the rate of return 
was on the order of five percent (0.05), the right-hand ratio would have been one-tenth, or ten 
percent.   
  In today’s modern economy, or in the antebellum era, the left-hand term would have been 
well below ten percent for a decisive voter. Today children have almost no earning power during 
the school-age years, making the first term effectively zero.  In today’s setting, therefore, the 
more propertied the decisive voter (higher Li), the lower would be the tax support for schooling 
(s). The result for antebellum America would already have approached this condition, to the 
extent that restrictions on political voice would have put the decisive votes in the hands of those 
who were rich enough that their discretionary income would not have depended at all on child 
earnings.  Then, too, schooling would have been limited by the property ownership of the 
decisive voter. 
  The only setting in which greater property for key voters could have raised their support 
for school taxes would have been a setting highly dependent on child labor, so that the first term 
could dominate in Equation (15).  Such settings would be rare.  To be sure, most of human 
history consisted of impoverished agricultural settings in which childrens’ labor would have been 
much needed by poor parents.  But in those same settings, political voice was restricted to those 
owning large amounts of property.  Again the reliance on child labor would have been below ten 
percent for those with political voice, leaving the result that restricting voice to those with above-
average land holdings meant less support for schools.   
  
III. The Implied Predictions    Page  54 
 
  Given the decisive voter’s setting the amount of tax support for schools, the individual 
households would choose their enrollments (Si’s) as modeled in Part I of this appendix.  Thus 
does the interplay of voting power and the distribution of property influence the enrollments and 
the public and private expenditures on common schools.  The combined model yields the 
predicted coefficients for cross-sectional regressions on antebellum U.S. counties shown in 
Appendix Table A.1.  
  Note in particular that the featured voting variables are a mixture of constraints and voter 
preferences.  The main constraint is the share of all free men who are franchised.  The tighter this 
is, the higher is the property position of the decisive voter (Li), and the lower the predicted 
support for schooling.  The voter preferences are represented in the tradition of Meltzer and 
Richard (1981), as well as in the present model, by skewness in the distribution of property. 
More skewness would make the decisive voter favor more taxes and schools.  Skewness is 
represented in mirror image by the median/mean ratio in this table.     Page  55 
Appendix Table A.1.  Predicted Coefficients:  Aligning the Model with the Regressions 
 
      Corresponding empirical variable(s) in county samples, 
Model variable  with predicted signs of effect on subsidies and enrollments 
 
  Dependent variables: 
s, φ    public  expenditures  per  common-school pupil, in the census  
Si    share  of  school-age  children  enrolled and attending common schools 
  
  Featured independent variables: 
Decisive voter’s Li  (1) franchise share (+);  
      (2) share owning no property (-),  
    in  the  1850  IPUMS. 
 
  Other independent variables: 
PLLall    real  estate  value  per  free man in that county (+) 
wc      None used here, for want of an easy proxy 
Wi      None used here (could proxy with occupational mix,  
        but at the risk of endogeneity) 
N, ni      School-age share of total population (-) 
α    Religion,  urban  share,  etc. 
 
      (State fixed effects cannot be assigned to any one model variable.)    Page  56 
APPENDIX B. 
Instrumental-Variable Equations 
For Northern Counties’ Enrollment Rates in 1850 
 
 
  As noted in the main text, the instruments used here are the number of years of residency 
in the state required for voting, these interacted with the immigrant share from other states, the 
same residency requirements interacted with the share foreign-born, and the existence of a state 
property requirement for voting. 
  Equations for expenditures per child and teachers per child did not pass the tests for 
instrument strength (validity) and/or exogeneity.  On the criteria for instrument strength, see 
Staiger, D., and J. H. Stock, “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments,” 
Econometrica, Vol.65, No.3, May 1997, pp.557-586. 
 
Appendix Table B.1.   OLS Determinants of Northern Counties' Enrollment Rates 
  in 1850, with Instrumented Values for Votes per White Man 
          
  Public school enrollments  Total enrollments 
  per white child 5-14    per white child 5-14 
 coeff. (s.e.) coeff.  (s.e.)
Votes per white man 
(instrumented) 1.31 (0.61) *  1.32  (0.61)
Slaves per white man  -0.11 (24.56)   2.22  (24.55)
Free coloreds per white  -4.17 (1.20) **  -4.30  (1.20)
Children 5-14 as a pop. 
share -0.80 (0.14) **  -0.85  (0.14)
Share of men over 40  2.64 (0.47) **  2.71  (0.47)
Urban share  0.01 (0.11)   0.11  (0.11)
Migrants from other states  -0.08 (0.12)   -0.09  (0.12)
Foreigners -0.09 (0.27)   -0.10  (0.27)
County is on the Great 
Lakes 0.05 (0.06)   0.05  (0.06)
Atlantic coast  0.06 (0.08)   0.06  (0.08)
Ohio River  0.06 (0.07)   0.06  (0.07)
Mississippi River  -0.01 (0.13)   -0.03  (0.13)
Church accommodations per capita        
Baptists 0.41 (0.15) **  0.42  (0.15)
Christian n.e.c.  -0.38 (0.26)   -0.35  (0.26)
Congrational 0.00 (0.26)   0.06  (0.26)
Congrational orthodox  3.17 (6.71)   2.46  (6.71)
Dutch Reformed  -0.17 (0.39)   -0.18  (0.39)
Episcopal -0.07 (0.50)   0.05  (0.50)
Free Churches  -0.10 (1.25)   -0.18  (1.25)
Friends or Quakers  -0.42 (0.30)   -0.34  (0.30)   Page  57 
German Reformed  -0.43 (0.64)   -0.27  (0.64)
Jewish 2.32 (11.28)   0.50  (11.27)
Lutheran -0.17 (0.26)   -0.22  (0.26)
Mennonite -0.93 (2.30)   -1.15  (2.30)
Methodist 0.022 (0.09)   0.028  (0.09)
Moravian 0.01 (0.66)   -0.07  (0.68)
Presbyterian -0.06 (0.17)   -0.04  (0.17)
Roman Catholic  -0.33 (0.27)   -0.25  (0.27)
Swedenborgian Churches  -1.45 (12.86)   -3.55  (12.85)
Tunker Churches  1.94 (1.41)   1.87  (1.41)
Union Churches  0.94 (0.51)   1.07  (0.51)
 coeff. (s.e.)   coeff.  (s.e.)
Unitarian Churches  -0.27 (1.09)   -0.56  (1.09)
Universalist Churches  0.86 (0.76)   0.92  (0.76)
Minor Sects  0.58 (0.63)   0.60  (0.63)
New = 1/(years since 
statehood) 0.30 (0.27)   0.27  (0.27)
Constant -0.15 (0.31)   -0.10  (0.31)
 
 
Observations 518     517 
F 9.672     10.9469 
Standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
        
Shea Partial R2  0.082     0.082 
Partial R2  0.082     0.082 
F (First Stage)  10.7     10.6 
df 4     4 
df_r 479     478 
p(F First)  2.66E-08     2.84E-08 
Sargan Hansen  0.539     0.625 
p(S-H) 0.910     0.891 
dof(S-H) 3     3 
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